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A RAWLSIAN BASIS FOR CORE LABOUR RIGHTS   
Abstract: 
John Rawls’s Theory of Justice is the most influential work of political philosophy of recent 
times. Rawls does not, however, consider the issue of labour rights. This paper considers 
the applicability of the rights of workers to join unions, bargain collectively, and to strike 
under Rawls’s theory, in the context of empirical research showing how individuals are, in 
practice, best protected at work. We argue that, in developed countries at least, Rawls’s 
theory supports the core rights of workers to organize, strike and bargain collectively with 
employers, under a combination of Rawls’s first and second principles of justice. We then 
consider the international dimension, discussing how labour rights are to be viewed 
internationally both under Rawls’s own international theory in his Law of Peoples, and 
under globalist interpretations of his theory of justice. 
Key words:  
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International Labour Rights Today 
The issue of labour rights has acquired increasing global salience as labour markets have 
been re-structured and global inequality has increased.1  It has for example, been argued 
that a more developed, systematic and critical view of justice issues in labour management 
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is required.2 It has also been suggested that even relatively developed legal national and 
regional approaches to labour rights based on versions of ‘voluntarism’ are inadequate.3 
Further, the currently inadequate philosophical underpinning of labour rights deprives their 
advocates of depth of argument, which may in turn contribute to a loss of welfare for large 
numbers of workers.4 In responding to this third point, this article makes a modest attempt 
to link philosophy with labour rights by using Rawls’s theory of justice and interpreting it 
in the light of employment relations research. 
 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO), in its Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work (1998), refers to four core rights applicable to workers in all countries, 
regardless of their level of economic development. These are (a) freedom from 
discrimination, (b) freedom of association and right to effective collective bargaining, (c) 
freedom from compulsory or forced labour and (d) effective abolition of child labour. We 
concentrate in this paper, on (b); the freedom of association (i.e. right to organise) and the 
right to collective bargaining. These rights are today embodied in two of the eight 
fundamental ILO Conventions; namely Conventions 87 (Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise) and 98 (Right to Organise and to Collective 
Bargaining). Nations that are signatories to these Conventions pledge to give workers the 
right to form and join organisations of their choice without interference. They also agree to 
establish mechanisms to guarantee these rights and to encourage negotiation between 
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employers’ and workers’ organisations. These rights are similarly recognised in other 
international instruments, such as the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
(Article 20), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (Article 
8), the UN Global Compact 2000 (Principle 3) and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises 1976 (Chapter 3). 
Despite the supposedly universal nature of these rights and their identification as core 
labour rights, and despite various attempts to regulate and streamline labour standards at 
international level, they have continued to be resisted by many countries. This is 
particularly the case in the developing world, although some developed countries have also 
been reluctant to accept them.5 Canada and the United States, for example, have not ratified 
the ILO Convention 98. In the UK, the goals of labour law policy, dominated by the need 
to enhance competitiveness,6 has led to comprehensive attacks on the institutions of 
collective bargaining, with marginal attention being paid to the ‘social rights’ of workers or 
the reality of the power of multinationals.7 Discussions at European level on how to tackle 
‘flexicurity’ (flexibility in the labour market plus secure guarantees for workers) have, to 
date, only brought about limited enhancement of worker rights despite repeated pleas for 
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workers to be guaranteed fundamental rights by labour market policy.8 The ITUC recently 
pointed out (2010) that the implementation of the core rights is often weak even in those 
countries which have ratified the conventions. It suggests that many countries, despite a call 
by G20 leaders, have used the recent global crisis as a pretext for weakening and 
undermining trade union rights.9 Indeed, core labour rights remain vulnerable in the face of 
globalisation, the erosion of the employment relationship itself through varied means and 
the resultant decline in trade unionism.  
Developing countries are even more resistant to adopting core labour rights. Their denial is 
justified in terms of a prior need to achieve economic growth, linked to and justified by the 
language of modernity and ‘trickle-down’ economics.10 It is claimed that the adoption of 
core labour standards undermines the comparative advantage they enjoy, especially in the 
production of low value-added goods.11 The argument is that developing countries must 
first develop before they can meaningfully engage in the ‘rights’ discourse12 and that the 
implementation of labour standards currently encouraged by the ILO is highly premature, 
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counterproductive and even neo-imperialist. Those opposing the regulation and 
enforcement of labour rights also contend that they are obstacles to closing the ‘industrial 
gap’ between themselves and more developed countries. They argue that ‘free’ labour 
markets promote the efficient allocation of resources and that, in the fullness of time, 
industrialisation will lead to better living and working conditions for workers. Imposing a 
legal obligation on firms to observe stringent labour standards is liable to lead to high 
labour costs and low employment, production and income levels, making it more difficult 
for developing countries to attract foreign direct investment.13  These propositions are 
utilitarian, unsurprising since both neo-liberalism and utilitarianism have been linked 
philosophies since their nineteenth century origins.  
 
Yet it is accepted that the rights to organise and bargain collectively help redress the 
inherent imbalance in the employment relationship.14 As we discuss below, the right to 
collective bargaining is a vital tool in reducing inequalities, raising wages and improving 
workers’ health and safety. We note that for all their arguments, neo liberal approaches to 
labour regulation have been powerfully challenged by empirical research. Elliott & 
Freeman15 for example, challenge the ‘trickle-down’ effect and argue that there is in fact no 
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contradiction between ‘development’ and labour rights. Freeman presents evidence to show 
that to the extent that legal protection of property rights is an important contributor to 
economic growth, so too is the protection of labour rights, particularly in developing 
countries. He rejects the commonly held view that protection of labour rights is negatively 
associated with economic success when compared to the protection of property rights.16 In 
short, and contrary to the arguments advanced by neo-liberal legal theorists,17 he suggests 
that there is no ‘zero-sum game’ in the rights of employers and workers whereby a gain by 
one party must necessarily result in a loss by the other.  
 
Whilst recognising the importance of these practical and empirical disputes, we supplement 
them with a philosophical argument. We propose that the rights to organise and bargain 
collectively have a philosophical basis that may be derived from Rawls’s theory of justice.  
 
Our Approach to Rawls 
We adopt the political philosophy of John Rawls (1921 – 2002) as a basis within which to 
discuss the rights to organise and collective bargaining. Rawls’s contributions have been 
used in discussions of business ethics.18 We base our arguments around his magnum opus, 
the Theory of Justice. Where relevant, we draw on his later works, notably Political 
Liberalism, Justice as Fairness, and The Law of Peoples.  
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Rawls’s works have attracted criticism, with many philosophers disagreeing with his 
suppositions in relation to the nature and function of the state, for the apparently 
‘unencumbered’ and atomistic nature of individuals in his thought, or for adopting an 
imperfect notion of ‘liberty’. The libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick, for example, 
rebuts Rawls’s argument that there is such a thing as a just ‘distribution’ of goods or that it 
is the state’s responsibility to ensure such a distribution. Similar criticisms have been 
levelled by socialist and feminist critics.19 Nozick counters Rawls’s view of redistributive 
justice, arguing for a minimal state, contending that when a state assumes more 
responsibilities, rights will be violated.20 Republican theorist Philip Pettit critiques the 
liberal view of freedom (including Rawls’). He contends that we should conceive of liberty 
as freedom from non-domination, rather than as freedom from non-interference, as on the 
liberal view. To take the example of a benevolent slave master, the slave is still not free 
even though the master may not exercise his power. The slave remains a slave.21 Others 
have criticised Rawls for taking a universal view of rights, contending that values and 
beliefs are shaped by the cultures and values of specific communities, and that these vary 
from country to country.22 It is beyond the scope of this paper to address these criticisms. 
We recognise the merits of these differing views. We do not assert that Rawls, in any of his 
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works, produces the correct theory of politics. The question of what political theory is 
appropriate for any purpose, general or particular, is a question outside the scope of this 
exercise. Rather, this paper is an academic attempt to see if Rawlsian premises lead to 
support for labour rights, not to defend those premises. The reason we are interested in 
Rawls is not that we think he is correct. It is rather because of what we might term the 
objective historical importance of Rawls’s thought. The importance of Rawls's work does 
not lie in a consensus that it is correct in its details. Few people accept Rawls's thought as 
correct in toto; indeed, it is rare for any philosopher's thought to be accepted in a pure form. 
Rather, the importance of Rawls’s work lies in its preponderant influence on subsequent 
political thought. Our interest in Rawls then derives from his seminality, not from fidelity 
to his ideas. This being the case, we focus on the work of Rawls’s which is most influential, 
namely his Theory of Justice, rather than on his 'mature' position articulated most clearly in 
Political Liberalism. The Theory of Justice has a singular importance of its own, such that 
G. A. Cohen can claim that it is possibly the most important work of political philosophy 
ever written, a title for which only Plato’s Republic and Hobbes’s Leviathan might hope to 
challenge it.23 It is of course necessary nonetheless to consider the Theory of Justice in the 
context of Rawls’s broader thought. 
So, we take Rawls’s Theory of Justice qua the most influential contemporary 
political philosophy, and we take the ILO’s declaration qua the most weighty single 
international convention on labour rights, and bring these together. However, these two are 
hard to relate to one another, for two main reasons, which will be dealt with in detail one 
after the other in due course. The first is that Rawls has almost nothing to say about labour 
rights. The other problem is that the Theory of Justice is supposed to apply primarily to the 
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national case, where the latter is global in scope. Rawls does propound his own 
idiosyncratic theory of international relations in the Law of Peoples. However, certain 
interpreters of Rawls have argued that Rawls's restriction of the theory of justice in this way 
is unnecessary and even incoherent. They argue against Rawls that his core national theory 
of justice, or at least more aspects of it than he allows, ought to apply globally.24 These 
arguments indicate that Law of Peoples is actually only tangentially and contingently 
related to the Theory of Justice.  
 The main body of our argument will deal with the implications of Rawls’s Theory 
of Justice for labour rights in the national case. According to a globalist reading of Rawls’s 
theory, these consequences actually extend worldwide via international institutions, such as 
the ILO. According to Rawls, however, implications of the Theory only apply for liberal 
democracies. We will therefore in addition at the end of the article consider the 
applicability of core labour rights under his law of peoples. Our question then in terms of 
the ILO declaration is primarily the applicability of these principles in our society, and only 
separately the applicability of these principles as a global norms connected to international 
institutions. 
 Whatever the scope of applicability of Rawls’s theory, we note that it is a political 
theory only, rather than a complete moral or ethical theory, hence "political, not 
metaphysical".25  In his later works, he articulates a political theory intended to obtain an 
overlapping consensus from many different comprehensive moral views. The justification 
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of political institutions, and political rights, for Rawls, is distinct from ethical 
argumentation in a number of important ways, in part because of what he calls the ‘burdens 
of judgment’: people who engage in sincere moral reasoning, and who look at the same 
range of facts, will not always come to the same moral conclusions, even over the long run. 
 
Rawls’s Theory of Justice  
Rawls’s Theory of Justice has as a basic axiom that ‘justice is the first virtue of social 
institutions’; that is, that social justice was primarily a matter of correctly organising 
society’s major institutions,26 which he termed the ‘basic structure of society’. This 
structure is of paramount importance because it determines how basic rights, opportunities, 
income and wealth are distributed. Rawls drew heavily on Kant’s ideas regarding the 
autonomy and dignity and worth of the individual, while also developing the Enlightenment 
political-philosophical concept of the ‘social contract’, that is, the hypothetical coming 
together of individuals voluntarily to agree on the foundational rules for social 
governance.27  
 
The obvious problem for such ‘contractarian’ thought is that of how people would reach 
agreement about the rules which should govern their society. Rawls sidesteps the problem 
by retaining the notion of a social contract as a purely hypothetical element of a theory of 
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justice. That is, we ask in the here and now what we would do if we were in a position to 
impartially consider how society should be structured. This appeals to our capacity to think 
beyond our partial interests to pose the question of what a fair society would look like. 
Rawls does this via a detailed thought experiment in which he imagines hypothetical 
‘representative persons’ shorn of their partiality, meeting in what he calls the ‘original 
position’. It is characterised by a ‘veil of ignorance’ which ensures impartiality by 
preventing participants from knowing any details about their social position or identity in 
the real world, without the particular prejudices and personal characteristics that ordinarily 
prevent people from agreeing: 
 
‘…no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does 
anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his 
intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know 
their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The 
principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance...’ (Theory of Justice, 1971: 
12).  
The position is entirely hypothetical but allows us to ascertain what is fair, which for Rawls 
is coterminous with what is just where the structure of society is concerned. 
 
The original position is only a device within Rawls’s overall theory of justice, however, if a 
vivid emblem of the whole. Rawls’s general procedure for determining what is just is what 
he calls ‘reflective equilibrium’. This means starting with certain intuitive ideas about what 
justice means, using these as the basis for developing a theory, which then affects one’s 
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intuitions, which as adjusted can then be used as the basis for further refinements of the 
theory, and so on, until intuitions and theory are in accord and a stable conception of justice 
is reached. The articulation of the ‘original position’ occurs as part of this movement, based 
on intuitions but then changing our intuitions in its turn, which then have a reciprocal 
influence on its articulation and so on. 
 
Individuals in the ‘original position’ would therefore agree with many of our intuitive 
judgments about justice. For example, they would want to structure society such that 
discrimination on the basis of race and gender was minimised: since people in the original 
position do not know their own gender and race, they will want to ensure that the social 
contract will not disadvantage them. Individuals in the original position are taken to be 
rational maximisers of their own utility. This is necessary to ensure an outcome from the 
original position that is just. Rawls argues that the rational way to act is to take care to 
maximise the worst possible outcome from a situation (sometimes called the ‘maximin’ 
strategy). We should be concerned with the worst realistic scenario in a situation and take 
care first to ensure that in that situation we will be as well protected as possible. 
 
The upshot of this is that a major arbiter of justice for Rawls is the well-being of the worst 
off ‘representative person’ in a given society: when choosing between two social 
arrangements, the representatives in the original position would choose the one in which the 
worst-off person would be the best taken care of, since those in the original position would 
be concerned that they might themselves be this disadvantaged person. Rawls argues that 
the society in which the relatively worst-off person is best-off in absolute terms is a liberal 
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market society with considerable inequalities in wealth which drive the economic 
productivity of society as whole, though he is indifferent as to whether the ownership of the 
means of production in such a society be capitalist or socialist, that is, private or public.28 
 
First principle of justice 
Before such economic considerations, Rawls believes that people in the original position 
would be concerned to ensure that they are afforded certain basic rights. Therefore, Rawls’s 
first ‘principle of justice’ is concerned with basic liberty, not economics: this principle is a 
variation on the liberal principle of liberty, that one should be free to do whatever one 
wants so long as it harms no-one else; Rawls’s formulation is that  
 
‘Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal 
basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all’ (Theory of Justice, 
1999, 46).29  
 
These basic liberties, for Rawls, include freedom to participate in the political process, 
freedom of association and assembly, of speech, of conscience and freedom of thought, of 
the person, from arbitrary arrest and seizure and the right to hold personal property.30 Thus, 
through the atomistic conception of individuals, their rights to associate and assemble are 
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recognised. For Rawls, these collective rights derive from and are dependent on individual 
rights.  
 
Second principle of justice 
Only after establishing these basic liberties, does Rawls argue that those in the original 
position would go on to formulate a Second Principle of Justice, which essentially concerns 
the distribution of goods, including both material wealth and more abstract things such as 
further rights. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle, and 
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity. (Theory of Justice, 1971: p. 302) 
 
This latter ‘equal opportunity’ clause requires that everyone with the same native talents, 
abilities and skills has the same economic opportunities, irrespective of their backgrounds. 
Rawls allows for inequalities of outcome. Such social and economic inequalities (i.e. 
wealth, income, power and authority) are only permissible if these inequalities are to the 
benefit of the least advantaged (the ‘difference principle’). Thus departures from equality 
were only permitted to the extent that the inequality improves the position of those who 
would be least advantaged. Society could give more income, status or power or authority to 
some than to others, but only if, by doing so, life would be better for the disadvantaged. 
What Rawls did not permit was social and economic inequalities which made life better for 
any (no matter how many), that disadvantaged the worst-off; throughout his works, he 
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explicitly opposed utilitarianism.31 Thus, the second principle allows forms of inequality 
that are limited and strictly conditional. Rawls gives equality of opportunity priority over 
the difference principle. 
Applying Rawls’s theory  
The relevance of Rawls’s work to our subject is not immediately obvious, and indeed his 
strong emphasis on individual rights under the first principle might be assumed to render it 
inapplicable to a discussion of collective rights. Rawls says very little about labour rights in 
his works.32 This has not deterred scholars from linking Rawls’s philosophy to workers and 
the workplace, however. Hsieh, for example, argues that Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’ 
entails protecting workers by granting them a basic right to adequate protection against 
arbitrary interference in the workplace on the basis that if a worker is arbitrarily interfered 
with, this would be treating him or her as lacking in standing or in worth, which in turn 
damages his or her capacity to develop a sense of self worth and self confidence, an 
essential feature of Rawls’s theory.33 Hsieh contends that the effective exercise of the right 
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to protection against arbitrary interference might require the establishment of bodies or 
agencies such as adjudicative bodies internal to the firm, committees or worker 
representation rights on the board in order to contest managerial decision making. 
Specifically, he envisages that unions can play a role as a body to constrain the scope of 
managerial discretion in the workplace.34 We will consider his arguments and those of the 
raft of other scholars who have applied Rawlsian political philosophy to labour issues 
below. 
 
Applying Rawls’s theory to collective labour rights is for us a matter of asking where, if 
anywhere, in his schema, these rights can be said to apply: are they guaranteed under the 
first principle, the second, are they merely something that is just for the constitutions of 
particular kinds of society, or indeed are they not supported by Rawls’s theory of justice at 
all? In what follows, we consider the core labour rights in the ‘lexical’ order used by Rawls, 
so first the under the first principle, then the second. 
 
The first principle 
The first principle mandates a set of  basic equal rights for all members of a society, and 
that we should have as many as are possible on that basis. Thus, for any given right, there is 
a presumption that we should be accorded it as long as our enjoyment of that right does not 
impinge on anyone else’s rights. Rawls viewed the exercise of basic liberties as so central 
that it may be restricted only if that were needed to protect some other basic liberty, or 
                                                                                                                                                    
normally essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of their worth as persons and to be able to 
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would lead to a greater overall liberty in the scheme of basic liberties, or in extreme 
situations of material distress.35 It is unjust, from a Rawlsian perspective, for governments 
or firms to make deals (from a position of power) with workers to sacrifice or restrict any 
basic right in order to secure an increase in material living standards. The lexical priority of 
liberty prohibits this sort of restriction of basic liberties. 
Recall that Rawls included within the list of basic liberties the right to vote, freedom of 
speech, freedom of the person and the freedom of association. Rawls does not 
comprehensively catalogue what freedoms might be held to obtain under this principle, 
however – his remarks relating to its practical content are at best suggestive. The fact that a 
right is not explicitly recognised here by Rawls ought not then be taken to imply that he 
was deliberately excluding it. Why this is significant will be revealed shortly (in relation to 
a right to strike).  
In terms of the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, three of 
the four principles declared there are already explicitly recognised by Rawls in his Theory 
of Justice, at least in part, as fundamental rights covered by his first principle of justice, that 
is, as rights that people in the original position would identify as core. There is a principle 
that forced labour should be eliminated, which one can easily identify with Rawls’s claim 
that slavery is unjust under the first principle (no one would be willing to countenance a 
world in which they might be a slave). There is an ILO right to the elimination of 
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discrimination; compare Rawls’s claim that racial discrimination is obviously unjust.36 
Only the principle that child labour should be abolished finds a lacuna in Rawls, inasmuch 
as he has nothing to say on this issue. 
We will not be concerned with any of these principles, however, in any case. We will focus 
squarely on the first, the ‘freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining’. Now, this is a compound principle, combining two rights on  the 
face of it: freedom of association is coupled with the right to bargain collectively. Of these, 
the first is clearly supported by Rawls as a basic right under the first principle. He moreover 
holds that ‘The government has no authority to render associations either legitimate or 
illegitimate’37 This implies that we are free to join unions, since there is no authority to 
determine that unions are an illegal organisation, and we have the freedom to associate with 
whomever we want (unless it be in the pursuit of an unlawful activity, or in conditions of 
dire emergency). This unrestrained freedom of association further implies the right of 
associations to in turn associate with other associations. Hence, labour unions have a right 
to have fraternal relations with one another, and to communicate with employers and 
employers’ associations.  
‘Collective bargaining’, however, is not mentioned by Rawls. Indeed, the collective rights 
of labour, and the entire possibility of a ‘collective’ right, is a lacuna in Rawls’s discussion, 
though since he does name freedom of association, which is categorically a collective right 
(though, for Rawls, rooted in individual rights), we have evidence that he does not oppose 
such rights per se. 
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There is good reason that the rights of freedom of association is conjoined with the right to 
collective bargaining in the ILO Declaration: the right to belong to a union is meaningless 
if that union is banned from actually operating as such in the workplace. That is, a labour 
union is an association that exists to the end of collective bargaining. However, the right to 
associate is logically distinct from any right to conduct a particular activity in association 
with others. 
 
Indeed, a right to bargain collectively, far from being simply neglected, is in effect 
explicitly excluded by Rawls under the first principle, when he excludes the freedom to 
enter into contracts from his schedule of basic liberties.38 This exclusion does not to mean 
that Rawls wants to forbid people from negotiating contracts – it is just that he does not 
think this is a basic freedom under the first principle. Rawls wants to allow that, pursuant to 
the second principle, the state may restrict people’s freedom to contract. This could include 
contracts between employers and employees. Indeed, a minimum wage or any legislated 
minimum working conditions would constitute a limitation of the freedom of negotiation. 
Hence, the limitation seems to be quite compatible with a concern for the interests of 
workers. There can be no complete right to collective bargaining under the first principle, 
because such an untrammelled right would not even be desirable, since it implies the right 
to make grossly unfavourable and exploitative agreements. Indeed, an unlimited right to 
enter into contracts would lead to the situation famously outlined by Robert Nozick using 
the example of Wilt Chamberlain, leading to the collapse of the entire second principle of 
justice qua attempt to influence the distribution of goods: people would be free to get into 
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relationships that would be economically bad for them and that the government would be 
powerless to remedy entirely. 
 
That being the case, it would be very surprising if the ILO were to demand such a complete 
right to bargain, so of course it does not, but rather only ‘the effective recognition of the 
right to collective bargaining’ (our emphasis). We take ‘effective recognition’ to mean that 
some substantial right to collective bargaining ought to be recognised, but without implying 
total government non-interference. The question then is whether ‘effective recognition’ is 
something one could mandate under the first principle. I think the answer must be ‘no’. 
‘Effective recognition’ effectively implies a right mitigated not only by its compatibility 
with other rights guaranteed by the first principle (one does not demand an ‘effective 
recognition of the freedom of conscience’, but rather simply demands the freedom of 
conscience), but according to other considerations. We will therefore leave consideration of 
the right to bargain collectively for now until we reach the second principle 
 There is another right for us to address here under the first principle. Even the right to 
bargain collectively as asserted by the ILO is, taken in isolation, a hollow right. It is 
necessary to have the possibility of recourse to industrial action in some form to back one’s 
bargaining position in order for a right to bargain to be substantive. If it is illegal for 
workers to take any action opposing an employer’s interests, then the right to bargain is 
meaningless, since the employer is free to ignore workers’ attempts to negotiate. 
We therefore must consider not only the rights to organise and bargain collectively, but also 
the right of labour to act collectively. The paradigmatic form of such a right of labour, the 
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one most often discussed, is the right to strike, though other forms of industrial action exist. 
A right to strike is often mooted and has been seriously considered by the ILO for adoption 
as a declared right, though the ILO has not heretofore put it forward as a core right in the 
way it has other rights. That the ILO should be relatively conservative in asserting the 
rights of labour is unsurprising, given its tripartite structure and diplomatic position. 
However, the ILO has in various places outside of its most fundamental documents 
acknowledged that the right to bargain collectively implies a right to strike.39  
The right to strike appears as a special and controversial case, then, but we argue that from 
a rights perspective it is a simple, fundamental freedom. The right to conduct industrial 
action is in effect that to withdraw their labour in some way (quitting, striking, going slow) 
unless collective demands are met. As individuals, every worker, if they are not a slave 
(and slavery is explicitly not permitted under Rawls’s first principle) has a right to 
withdraw their own labour, and might of course threaten this in individual negotiations with 
their employer. Effectively, what occurs in industrial action is a pooling of individual rights 
into collective rights, via the individual freedom to associate with our peers, and in this 
respect we may still discuss these collective rights qua individual rights under Rawls’s first 
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principle of justice. That is, individuals may be said to have an individual right to join in 
collective industrial action to improve their conditions.  
Of course, it will be argued that there is no right to strike if it involves a breach of contract. 
However, no contract can literally force labour – if it did that, it would breach the right to 
freedom from slavery. Rather, it can only schedule penalties, typically financial, where 
labour is not performed. In effect, as long as the freedom to contract is limited by the right 
to freedom from slavery, there is an implied freedom to strike. Thus, it is because of the 
very lack of complete freedom to make contracts that prevents us having a primary right to 
bargain that we do have a primary freedom to strike. We cannot, according to Rawls, sign 
away our basic freedom to refuse to do any particular job.40 
Of course, a complete ban on bargaining would make striking pointless. We can say we 
have a fundamental right to strike, but that we won’t want to exercise it unless we also have 
a right to bargain. And we will now argue that there a substantive right to bargain 
collectively is assured under the second principle of justice. 
Second principle  
We will now consider labour rights under the second principle of justice. Even in the case 
of the rights we have argue above are guaranteed under Rawls’s first principle, it is useful 
to assess whether they are supported under the second principle (a) because there are 
conceivably historical circumstances in which the second principle may be taken to conflict 
with the first (i.e. where material wellbeing might be taken to conflict with civil rights) and 
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(b) in case our arguments in favour of the inclusion of these rights under the first principle 
be dismissed. 
The second principle of justice has two components: firstly, the so-called ‘difference 
principle’, which asserts that inequalities must be arranged so as to benefit the least 
advantaged, and, secondly, the caveat of equality of opportunity between persons. 
However, equality of opportunity is not in a strict sense in question where labour rights are 
concerned, so this is irrelevant to our purposes: equality of opportunity relates to whether 
someone ends up as a worker or a manager, for example, not the relations that then obtain 
between people in these positions. Of course, it makes a difference in the workplace if 
people get their position through the operation of equality of opportunity or not. For Rawls, 
equality of opportunity is important for reasons such as that it means workers have no 
reason to resent those in higher-paying positions. However, it does not pertain to any of the 
core rights of labour. Rather, then, what we have to consider in relation to the second 
principle is how the difference principle relates to workers’ rights. 
Our argument on this point can be expressed in the following syllogism: the difference 
principle consists in the promotion of the best interests of the poorest; workers’ rights and 
effective trade unions are in the interests of the poorest; therefore, the difference principle 
implies state support for workers’ rights and unionism. 
 
While we have already argued under the first principle for two key workers’ rights, the 
right to organise in unions and the right to strike, these two rights are, we have argued, of 
little practical value without an associated ability to collectively bargain. From the practical 
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point of view of producing social justice, and hence from the point of view of the difference 
principle, these three rights – to unionise, bargain collectively and undertake industrial 
action – should be viewed as a single compound, much as they are in the ILO Declaration.   
One might argue that the difference principle would tend to support any rights that applied 
to workers, since workers are relatively disadvantaged in relation to their employers. This 
certainly falls within the ambit of Rawls’s argument, since he takes ‘the unskilled worker’ 
and ‘the working class’ as exemplary of the ‘worse off’ for the purposes of applying the 
difference principle.41 
A concern here is that generally it is empirically not the case that the most disadvantaged in 
society are employees. Rather, it is more likely that the most disadvantaged will be 
unemployed. It can be argued that rights of labour impact adversely on the unemployed, for 
example by leading to less competitive industry, fewer jobs and hence higher 
unemployment. The classical economic argument against collective bargaining has indeed 
been that it distorts the price of labour upwards, thus excluding ‘outsiders’ including the 
unemployed.42 However, the argument has been strongly contested, since higher wages can 
increase the pool of labour available to employers and in turn increase employment through 
monopsony effects.43 The unemployed are disproportionately likely to enter employment at 
or around minimum wages, and it has been demonstrated that those countries where 
minimum wages are set by collective bargaining are less likely to experience negative 
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employment effects.44  In some countries, small positive employment effects have been 
observed where minimum wages are collectively bargained.45 Empirical information of this 
sort is available to those in the original position and would indicate that labour rights are in 
accordance with the difference principle.  
One could argue that the plight of the worst off can simply be addressed by giving them 
money. Rawls was resistant to this conclusion, however. His indifference to the question of 
public versus private ownership in the Theory of Justice was later nuanced by a distinction 
between five different possible forms of social system.46 One of these is what he calls 
‘welfare state capitalism’, which he rules against, favouring ‘property-owning democracy’ 
as a form of capitalism.47 What is relevant for our purposes in this is that Rawls does not 
want a social system that simply treats the poor as passive recipients, but rather one in 
which people are incentivised to ensure their own wellbeing 48 This is entirely consonant 
with the rights of labour: we must, following Rawls, argue for rights enabling people to 
pursue their own best interests, rather than simply giving them handouts.49 This 
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interpretation of Rawls is supported by the work of White (1998), who argues that trade 
unionism is so compatible with liberal values that he has argued that the state should adopt 
a promotive, as opposed to neutral, stance toward trade unionism.50 Unions are not, 
primarily, what White terms ‘expressive associations’ which promote particular 
conceptions of the good. If this were the case, then the state should adopt a ‘neutral’ stance 
toward them, and should neither encourage nor discourage their emergence or continuation, 
since from a liberal perspective, including Rawls’s, the state should not side with particular 
conceptions of the good, but rather have equal respect for all citizens’ conceptions of the 
good. Unions are, however, ‘instrumental associations’ in that their ‘primary purpose is to 
secure for [their] members improved access to strategic goods, such as income and wealth, 
the possession of which is important from the standpoint of more or less any conception of 
the good life’. Hence, state neutrality can be dispensed with. The strategic goods that 
unions secure, such as employment, education, training, income and job security, are 
primary goods that enable different citizens to pursue a diverse range of options. 
Consequently, to promote instrumental associations is not to force or impose any specific 
conception of the good on citizens. More positively, insofar as unions contribute to a more 
egalitarian distribution of primary goods, the liberal State should promote them as part of 
its more general duty to secure justice for its citizens. How might a promotional stance be 
carried out? Arguably, the state might include trade unions in structures of public 
governance such as skills forums or wage settlement through national income policies. This 
strategy of inclusion in public governance ‘directly promotes union influence, enhances the 
public utility of unions, and may also thereby enhances the legitimacy of unions in the eyes 
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of the wider citizenry, so encouraging union growth’. White however, makes a qualification 
for the promotion of trade unionism (pp.340). There is no place for weak and ineffective 
unionism in his argument, for he asserts that the state should promote a unionism which is 
both encompassing and which possesses strong capacities for coordinated decision making.  
Bogg (2009) takes this theme further and argues for laws, institutions and the political 
economy of the State to shape this kind of trade unionism.51  Since group actions are ‘a 
product of opportunities and incentives that are induced by the structure of political 
institutions and the substance of political choices’, this entails that associational patterns 
can be reshaped through a modification of the regulatory framework that creates those 
opportunities and incentives. Bargaining institutions and regulatory environments are 
inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing; States are invariably implicated in the extent 
to which national institutions promote egalitarianism. Consequently, it is impossible to 
disentangle the State’s own regulatory choices from the egalitarian shortcomings of a 
particular system of collective bargaining. Accordingly, the liberal egalitarian State is duty-
bound to promote encompassing and authoritative bargaining institutions that are well 
placed to realise egalitarian ends.52  
Lastly, even if not guaranteed as a primary basic individual rights, we point to empirical 
research that demonstrates that the collective rights of labour are necessary to protecting 
individual rights in the workplace. The lengthy tradition of employment relations 
scholarship has been based on the argument that the relationship between the individual 
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worker and the employer is structurally weighted towards the latter and collective 
organisation is required to redress the balance.53 Several influential researchers have shown 
that individual worker rights are in practice most effectively enforced by collective 
representation. Harcourt, Wood & Harcourt54 demonstrate that despite perceptions that 
collective and individual rights are mutually exclusive, the possibility of collective action in 
fact strengthens individual rights in workplaces. Using evidence of employer compliance 
with anti-age legal provisions in New Zealand, they demonstrate that individual and 
collective rights are highly complementary: union presence strengthens individual 
protection from discriminatory treatment. Of significance are their re-iterations that 
collective voice reduces individual worker’s prospects of voicing any concerns they may 
have, and makes them more difficult for employers to disregard and possibly victimise. 
Unionised workers are more likely than their non-unionised counterparts to exercise their 
individual rights in a thorough and comprehensive manner. This includes legal rights, often 
too costly and difficult for individual workers to enforce.55 Addison & Belfield56 confirm 
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these propositions, arguing that individual rights (such as those given by the law or 
stipulated in the contract between workers and employers), are most effectively enforced by 
collective organisation and not through individual legal action. Equity and stability are also 
served by unionisation which has been shown to reduce gender pay differentials and 
turnover rates and secure greater tenure.57 In addition, recent international research suggests 
that unions tend to reduce race pay differentials for those of different races, genders and 
sexual orientations.58 Further, unionised workplaces have been shown to have lower 
accident rates and less ill-health than their non-union equivalents.59 Thus, collective 
organisation strengthens individual rights, well-being and equity. Conversely, lack of voice 
on the part of workers exacerbates existing problems faced by them and increases the 
possibility that they are treated in ways perceived by individuals as unfair.60 For example, 
even where minimum rights are legally guaranteed in developed countries, as in the case of 
minimum wages, individual employee weakness can lead to a denial of these rights by 
relatively strong employers.61 These above arguments, largely developed in the context of 
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developed countries, have been shown to apply a fortiori in developing countries where 
formal employment and secure work is a minority case.62  
 
The developing countries context 
So far, we have discussed how core labour rights might apply to liberal democracies 
according to Rawls’s principles. Could these rights be argued to have the same weight in 
developing countries also? Rawls argued that his whole schema of creating a just basic 
structure applies only to societies which are sufficiently wealthy where it is possible 
for all citizens to exercise equal basic liberties. In these societies, maintaining equal 
civil liberties is regarded as deserving special priority (hence the lexical priority of the 
first principle over the second). Individuals cannot justly trade basic liberties for 
increased wealth, therefore. This special conception of justice prevails in all societies 
except the poorest and least civilised.63  
 
Where social conditions do not allow the effective establishment of basic liberties, 
however, one can acknowledge their restriction. Here, for Rawls, his general conception of 
justice applies. The denial of equal liberty can be accepted only if it is necessary to develop 
the quality of civilisation so that in time the equal freedoms can be enjoyed by all. That is, 
liberty can only sacrificed in the service of liberty. Thus Rawls allows for a mixing of the 
first and second principles, and a blurring of the lexical ordering of the two principles of 
justice, in societies in which individuals are not able to exercise basic liberties due to the 
                                                 
62
 R Croucher & E Cotton (2009), Global Unions, Global Business: Global Union Federations and 
International Business. London: Middlesex University Press 
63
 This conception rules out any trade-off between liberty and other primary goods, although it may 
allow the restriction of one liberty to enhance another liberty. Theory of Justice, 1971: pp. 244, 542, 
543. 
 31
low level of development of the society. Inequalities of liberty are thus allowed in 
circumstances where the level of civilisation in society is so low that people would starve; 
individuals in the original position would conceivably trade off their liberties in exchange 
for a draconian government, if it could be argued that this would on the whole, be best, 
even for the least advantaged, for example, because draconian government would meet 
their most basic needs of food, water and shelter, with the further caveat, as seen above, 
that this state of affairs was temporary and directed towards developing the economy to the 
point where a full range of liberties could be afforded to people.64 Similarly, the general 
conception of justice would allow for slavery, if it could be argued that in trading off their 
civil liberties for economic needs, this would be best on the whole, even for the slaves, for 
example, because they would be kept in a reasonable condition even if they were forced to 
work for nothing, and if this would lead to economic development that would allow slavery 
to be abandoned in time. This might sound unrealistic, but the point is that if it were true, 
then the general conception would allow slavery (although the special conception would 
not). This, importantly for our purposes, would mean that the rights to organise and strike 
could be restricted under such circumstances. Rawls does not however stipulate when a 
particular society is considered to have attained a minimum level of civilisation; he simply 
argues that once the minimum level has been attained, individuals behind the ‘veil’ would 
insist on the ‘lexically ordered’ two principles of justice.65  
 
At face value, Rawls’s argument would lend credence to neo-liberal arguments that in 
developing countries, the rights to organise and bargain collectively (even qua basic 
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liberties) may be sacrificed in the interests of securing economic growth and raising living 
standards. The Rawlsian claim can be made that in such countries it is necessary to sacrifice 
civil liberties temporarily to allow for growth that will foster civilisation in the longer term 
Is this a correct application of Rawls, however? Cases where countries would be so 
impoverished that basic liberties are to be suspended would in a contemporary context be 
highly unusual. It is doubtful if this can be argued to the generality of developing countries 
outside of specific natural disaster situations. Moreover, even in such societies Rawls does 
not advocate the abandonment of basic civil liberties tout court: there is always a 
presumption in favour of such liberties, and they can only be traded off where this is 
unavoidable and actually in the ultimate interest of producing these liberties. It does not 
provide a carte blanche for governments of developing countries. The denial of basic civil 
liberties is only justified for the sake of obtaining the largest possible system of rights.  
 
Furthermore, In relation to core labour rights, we would argue that the suspension of these 
rights does not empirically seem to lead to progress towards a position where more rights 
can be granted. The absence of such rights seems to impact negatively on societal 
development. It has been shown that in many countries the liberalisation of economic 
policies has accompanied increasing social inequalities, with little prospect of progress for 
workers. Smith, Bolyard & Appolito (1999), for example, contend that it is simplistic to 
think that economic progress automatically brings about political and civil freedom or that 
it will necessarily enlarge the social welfare of all citizens. On the contrary, research 
supports the case for labour rights and shows that labour standards are associated with 
improved governance, reduced corruption, improved income distribution and wages. Van 
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der Meulen & Berik (2006) argue that labour regulations designed to protect workers and 
improve working conditions achieve social objectives and affect international 
competitiveness. The costs of raising and enforcing labour standards are actually offset by 
dynamic efficiency gains and macroeconomic effects.  Last but not least, Scherrer (2007) 
argues that the development and expansion of the trading system of developing countries 
have not led to an improvement in living and working conditions. In actual fact, developing 
countries are limited in their ability to raise labour standards on their own. 
 
It is worth noting that the current neo-liberal trend is to structure laws and policies to the 
disadvantage of workers in both developed and developing countries.66 This trend is thus 
not fundamentally linked to a Rawlsian developmental logic, but is rather simply a 
ubiquitous claim that removing labour rights can lead to higher growth, which benefits 
everyone; this claim is implausible for reasons we have already indicated. The restriction of 
core labour rights has ramifications reverberating far beyond the workplace, affecting them 
and their families negatively – by taking away their dignity as individuals, lowering their 
quality of life and impoverishing them. 
 
Scherrer makes the case for worker rights to be negotiated internationally.67 This seems in 
line with the obvious conclusion from the evidence that labour rights are to the benefit of 
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the least advantaged in societies at various development: that the basic rights of workers 
ought to be universally recognised, since there is no good reason for them not to be 
recognised in any country in a state of civil stability (although, as mentioned above, we 
allow that the suspension of these rights might be necessary in situations of national 
emergency). 
 
 As noted before, however, the international applicability of Rawls’s theory of justice is 
contested. Some have argued that the original position ought to pertain to the whole world, 
that is, that we need a single, universal, worldwide account of justice stemming from a 
single original position valid for the whole world, effectively then treating humanity as a 
single global society. If we take that view, then the question is now settled. This is not 
Rawls’s own view, however. Rawls takes it that the world is divided into national societies 
and that each one in effect requires its own original position and theory of justice. In Law of 
Peoples, he develops a theory of just international arrangements, via a second-order, 
international original position, in which representatives of nations meet not knowing which 
nations they come from, in order to decide on the principles governing international 
relations within a larger ‘society of peoples’. This does not then involve coming up with a 
universal vision of how all societies should work, but rather a system for societies to relate 
to one another.  
 
There would for Rawls within such an international order be certain core ‘human rights’ 
which would be enforceable throughout the world. That is, one nation may enforce them in 
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the territory of another, and states that violate them are designated as ‘outlaw states’. As 
with right under the First Principle in the Theory of Justice, however, Rawls does not spell 
out what rights are human rights exactly, rather only giving a sample. Freedom of 
association is not in this sample, but ‘freedom from slavery and serfdom’ is.68 It in any case 
seems quite unlikely that collective bargaining and the full panoply of human rights could 
claim the full status of human rights in Rawls’s schema. Thus, it would be implausible to 
suggest that by Rawls’s lights one could justly enforce the core rights of labour 
internationally. 
Rawls does think we in developed countries have a duty to aid ‘burdened societies’, in 
which a liberal political culture is not developed, to develop such a culture.69 By our above 
arguments this should include the education of these countries in labour standards, but it 
does not imply the construction of formal international labour standards – though Rawls 
certainly does not say anything to rule these out per se. Similarly, while he does not include 
an international labour organisation in the list of international agencies he thinks desirable, 
there is nothing about the International Labour Organisation that contravenes Rawls’s Law 
of Peoples, since states join it voluntarily. That said, it is not clear from a strictly Rawlsian 
point of view why states would join it, that is, why states would want to establish uniform 
principles for labour rights. This points to a lacuna in Rawls’s international theory, 
inasmuch as it misses out the international actors involved in the tripartite structure of the 
ILO alongside states: employers and workers. Both of these groups in their own way have 
mobility beyond states, which Rawls signals no desire to curtail. Labour and employers, 
each in their own way in competition with others internationally, of course wish to establish 
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consistency, a ‘level playing field’ in labour rights. Workers in particular have reason to 
care about the lot of workers in other countries, because of the fear that worse conditions 
elsewhere means lower wages, producing a downward pressure on wages worldwide. To 
prevent a race to the bottom in labour conditions, workers will naturally desire 
internationally recognised minimum standards. Whatever its basis, international solidarity 
between workers is ignored in Rawls’s neo-Westphalian approach to the international. The 
international dimension to labour relations is a dimension of international relations which 
Rawls’s theory, unlike cosmopolitan interpretations of his theory, cannot account for. One 
can presume that actions of labour in support of international aims are allowable under 
Rawls’s theory of justice, as explained above, but there is no basis to examine the 
legitimacy of such actions in their specificity, because there of the exclusively national 
frame of Rawls’s theory. 
Those, on the other hand, Thomas Pogge most prominently, who have chosen to take 
Rawls’s basic theory of justice as globally valid, with the difference principle applying 
globally, rather than accept Rawls’s position that the international dimension is governed 
by its own specific rules quite distinct from those described in the Theory of Justice, could 
be taken to advocate a broader range of international rights norms which would encompass 
anything allowed under the basic theory. This would allow an argument for the global 
applicability of ILO core labour rights. This is of course still something quite different to 
universal enforcement of these rights, implying the nullification of the sovereignty of 
individual countries in favour of international institutions. The question of whether such a 
cosmopolitan rights regime is appropriate is quite outside of the scope of this article. We 
find Rawls’s own attempt to think justice internationally to be inadequate to the task when 
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it comes to labour rights, however, and as such we think such enforcement measures as 
currently are attempted in pursuit of international labour standards to be justified.  
 
Conclusion 
In accordance with Rawls’s theories, we can conclude the following. Firstly, in line with 
his first principle of justice, the right to strike and the right to belong to a union can be 
considered core rights that all liberal democracies should allow. Secondly, by his second 
principle, labour rights in general should be understood as necessary to social justice, such 
that liberal democracies should actively encourage the activity of unions. Lastly, by the 
‘duty of assistance’ in his Law of Peoples, in combination with our prior conclusions, aid 
should be given to assist countries which lack labour rights standards countries in 
producing a decent framework of rights and organisations for workers, as an aid to the 
development of those countries’ political societies, and as beneficial to the development of 
their economies.  
